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Abstract
Why do agents engage in costly dispute resolution such as litigation
and arbitration when costless settlement is available? I present a model
with one sided asymmetric information where the payoff from litigation
for both agents depends on the beliefs of the uninformed agent. Taking
these payoffs as their outside options, agents negotiate over the allocation
of an indivisible object that is in dispute and transfers. It is shown that
it is impossible to implement an allocation that satisfies budget balance
that guarantees the agents their payoff from conflict when agents can quit
negotiations unilaterally at any stage.
1 Introduction
Underpinning much of the architecture of neo-classical economics lies the as-
sumption of an omniscient judiciary. The existence of such a judiciary deters
undesirable behaviour. From Arrow-Debreu contingent commodities to incen-
tive contracts, agents perform their legal obligations in the knowledge that if
they do not, they will be punished. Although invoking the court is costly, this
does not lead to an inefficiency since even in the unlikely event of a dispute,
there is instantaneous resolution through bargaining as both parties are aware
that taking the dispute to court is costly.
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This logic creates the paradox of litigation: why do we observe litigation
at all when parties are aware of its costliness and costless settlement is avail-
able? This paper attempts to contribute to the large literature that address
this question. In this model parties have private valuation of the subject matter
in dispute. Unlike the standard setting with asymmetric information, there are
two additional ingredients that are both necessary in this model for non exis-
tence of efficient settlement. First, the beliefs of the uninformed agent affect the
payoff of both uninformed and the informed agent. And second, agents have
the right to quit negotiations unilaterally.
In this model the uninformed agent always has a higher valuation of the
surplus. In the presence of quitting rights there is a need to allocate the surplus
efficiently to the uninformed agent to ensure conflict is avoided for any possi-
ble revelation during negotiations. However this constrains the transfers to the
informed agent to be independent of his declaration. The main result of the
paper in proposition 1 shows that it is impossible to find a transfer that is high
enough to satisfy the ex-post participation of the informed agent for any reali-
sation of his type and low enough to satisfy the interim participation constraint
of the uninformed agent. In other words, negotiations make at least one of the
two agents strictly worse off. Thereafter I show (section 2.5) how agents avoid
litigation in this framework if they can commit not to use their quitting rights
unilaterally. Finally I show (section 3) how some of the assumptions about the
litigation payoffs required for the results arise endogenously when the litigation
game is assumed to take the form of a Tullock contest. I argue (section 4.2.2)
that this explanation for the existence of litigation generalises to some other
forms of conflict as well.
This paper contributes in two ways to the large literature that deals with
this question. First, it endogenises the informational asymmetry about the
agents’ outside options using non certifiable information about valuations. This
contribution is discussed in greater detail in section 1.1.1. Second, it derives
conditions under which this type of informational asymmetry causes negotia-
tions to break down even with the best possible mechanism. This is discussed in
section 1.1.2. Finally, the novel theoretical contribution of this paper in relation
to the mechanism design literature is discussed in section 1.2.
2
1.1 Relationship to Law and Economics Literature
The large literature that has arisen in response to the question of why people
litigate is now two generations old. The first generation literature started with
Landes (1971) who argued that litigation arises when its expected benefit is
greater than the expected costs for the parties. Parties do not strategically
interact at the pre-trial stage and litigation is avoided when the expected benefit
of litigating is lower than the expected cost. Out of court settlement occurs
when parties have similar expectations about the outcome of the trial. It is
worth explaining this point.
Uncertainty about the outcome of a trial is not sufficient to create litigation.
With uncertainty, both parties would form expectations about their payoff from
litigation. If the probabilities both associate with winning add up to one, they
would settle outside thereby saving themselves the cost of litigation. Litigation
arises for instance if both parties overestimate their chances of winning in court.
Though this literature acknowledges the role of such overestimation in gener-
ating litigation, it stops short of modelling how this overestimation arises and,
more importantly, the strategic behaviour of parties when they negotiate in the
presence of such overestimation.1
In response to this unresolved issue, a second generation literature arose
starting with P’ng (1983) and Bebchuk (1984). In Bebchuk (1984), the de-
fendant knows the probability of winning whereas the plaintiff only knows the
distribution over the probability of winning. The plaintiff makes an offer of
settlement which the defendant can accept or reject. If the offer is rejected, the
case goes to court. Since this bargaining game is played out between parties in
an environment of incomplete information, the inefficiency of litigation arises.2
This is a reflection of the broader theoretical insight that full efficiency is not
guaranteed with bargaining under incomplete information. In the next two sub-
sections the two problems with the second generation literature that this paper
1More examples include Gould (1973), Posner (1973), and Priest and Klien (1984).
2This result has been generalised in different ways. Schweizer (1989) allows for both parties
to be in possession of private information. Nalebuff (1987) allows for the informed agent to
make the settlement offer, thereby considering the signalling implications of the size of the offer
and its rejection. Spier (1992) considers more stages to bargaining. Friedman and Wittman
(2006) explore pre-trial settlement when parties employ the Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983)
protocol for bargaining. Although, as noted in Daughety and Reinganum (1994), the predic-
tions of these models vary in terms of equilibrium allocations for plaintiff and defendant, a
non-zero probability of litigation emerges as a robust phenomenon. In fact, Spier (1994), using
a mechanism design approach, shows that litigation would arise even when parties bargain
using the most efficient extensive form. See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and Hay and Spier
(1998) for surveys of this literature.
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seeks to address are explained.
1.1.1 Litigation and Full Disclosure
The first problem with the literature is the relationship between private informa-
tion of parties and the unobservability of the opponent’s payoff from litigation.
The justification given in this literature for private information leading to litiga-
tion payoffs being unobservable is that a party to a dispute may be in possession
of information that once revealed in court, increases its probability of winning.3
However if parties possess information that is assumed to be certifiable in
court, parties can choose to reveal it to each other outside court at the pre-trial
stage and consequently avoid costly litigation through bargaining under com-
plete information. This is a problem since it turns out that in the setting of these
models, parties always have an incentive to disclose their private information.
Grossman (1981) shows that when private information is certifiable, there
are very strong incentives to reveal it. This is because an agent with infor-
mation favourable to himself always wants to reveal it to increase the size of
the offer from his opponent. This leads to an unravelling since the agent who
chooses not to reveal his information ends up signalling that he has unfavourable
information.4
I propose a different approach by assuming that the asymmetry between
parties is about information that is inherently non-certifiable. In my model, a
party’s valuation of the subject matter is private information. I show (section
3) that this valuation determines the amount of effort an agent is willing to
exert in court, which in turn generates a probability of winning that is private
information of the party. Hence the diverging expectations that parties have
about the payoff from litigation are endogenously generated. In contrast to
private information on evidence which can be certified by the informed agent,
3Although the literature has focused on this channel, there are other channels through
which private information can generate unobservability of the payoff from litigation. For
example, even if parties have the same priors but have private valuations of the subject
matter in dispute, this is sufficient for bargaining to be inefficient. What is required is that
the expected payoff from litigation be private information. Overestimating the probability of
winning in court is only one of the ways in which this may happen.
4Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) derive conditions sufficient for this argument to work.
Shavell (1989) observes that this argument in the setting of litigation leads to certifiable
private information washing away before trial through voluntary disclosure and that volun-
tary disclosure needs to be ruled out exogenously for information asymmetry to arise in his
model. Similar to this paper, Hay (1995) also uses endogenous effort choices as a way of
generating asymmetric information and finds the existence of litigation in equilibrium while
focusing on laws mandating full disclosure. However the model is constructed under the
implicit assumption that the unravelling argument outlined above does not apply.
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declarations of valuation are essentially cheap talk; all types would declare that
they have high valuation since this increases the settlement offer they are likely
to receive.
1.1.2 Litigation and Communication
The second problem with the literature on litigation is its focus on bargaining
as a means of resolving disputes outside court. Focusing attention singularly
on bargaining implies that parties are restricted to interact through offers and
counter offers of the surplus and transfers are ruled out. This assumption is not
restrictive when parties have the same valuation over the surplus. However, in
an environment with private valuation this turns out to have a bite since there
could be settlement equilibria for instance when an agent with high valuation
offers transfers to one with low valuation in exchange for the surplus.
Communication between parties can include a sequence of messages ex-
changed in a rich language that could, in principle, mitigate the informational
asymmetry that exists between parties. To give just one example, going back to
the argument outlined in the previous subsection, the possibility of communi-
cation eliminates entirely any informational asymmetry arising from certifiable
pieces of information leading to efficient settlement in the second generation
models of litigation. Hence by restricting the form of pre-trial negotiation to be
of the bargaining variety, it is possible to miss out on equilibria in which parties
settle out of court.
The model presented here attempts the resolution of this problem using
a mechanism design approach. The seminal paper by Myerson (1982) shows
that an equilibrium of any Bayesian game can be replicated through a direct
mechanism. This result is known as the revelation principle. Using this in-
sight, the result presented here will show that litigation may arise even when no
restrictions are made about the nature of communication between parties dur-
ing pre-trial negotiation. Since bargaining games under incomplete information
form a subset of the Bayesian games parties could play, this is subsumed in the
model presented here.
This paper is part of growing literature that seeks to understand litigation
using mechanism design. For instance Mnookin and Wilson (1998) analyse
disclosure in a mechanism design setting. In a similar vein Klement and Neeman
(2005) also use a mechanism design approach to analyse the effect of different
fee shifting rules on balancing the trade-off between minimising litigation and
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deterring disputes. This paper differs from these in that it attempts to take
on board the full disclosure critique by assuming that certifiable information
is fully disclosed at the negotiation stage as a result of parties communicating
freely with each other.
1.2 Relationship to Mechanism Design Literature
This paper presents a new impossibility result that is not subsumed by Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) and related literature. Unlike the literature based on
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), where the uncertainty of gains from trade is
necessary, here the inefficiency of conflict is common knowledge between parties
who are consequently aware that out of court settlement is always more efficient.
In technical terms this implies that two sided private information is not required
and moreover it is common knowledge that valuation of the uninformed agent
is always greater than that of her opponent. Hence the distribution of valua-
tions of the two agents do not intersect. However, in contrast with Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983), there are two additional ingredients here. First, the inter-
dependence of outside options of both agents on the beliefs of the uninformed
agent, and second, the ability of parties to quit negotiations unilaterally. The
second requires the use of ex-post individual rationality compared to the weaker
interim individual rationality required by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
Of the papers related to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) this paper is most
closely related to Compte and Jehiel (2009) in the use of ex-post participation
constraints arising from the assumption that parties can quit negotiations uni-
laterally. There are two key differences. First, the inefficiency showcased here
does not require any uncertainty about who values the surplus more and con-
sequently only requires one sided private information. Second, the inefficiency
in this model arises from the dependence of the outside options for both agents
on the uninformed agent’s belief about the type of the informed agent.
This paper is also related to Celik and Peters (2011) who consider the pos-
sibility of signaling through rejection of mechanism. In their paper, parties can
design a mechanism before playing a default game that allows the type of the
informed agent to be revealed, modifying the beliefs under which the default
game is played. In that setting, allowing the possibility of rejection of the mech-
anism increases the set of implementable allocations. In contrast, in my setting,
the parties attempt to use a mechanism to avoid playing the default game alto-
gether and the possibility of rejection of the mechanism ex-post eliminates the
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existence of allocations that allow them to do that.
2 Model
There are two agents who find themselves in a dispute. The subject matter of
the dispute is characterised as an indivisible surplus over which agents have com-
peting claims.5 Both agents have a non-negative valuation of the surplus which
is their type. Agent 1’s (female) valuation is θ1, which is observable, whereas
agent 2’s (male) valuation is unobservable and can be θH with probability qH
and θL with probability 1− qH .6 I assume
Assumption 1.
θ1 > θH > θL.
The assumption that the valuation of a party is unobservable is the key driver
of litigation in this model. It is worthwhile to see some examples where litigation
can be interpreted as a dispute over surplus. These examples have been chosen
to illustrate how the model may apply to a large range of situations. Examples
include:
• Dispute over property: A party has private valuation over a piece of prop-
erty and it is unclear as to who has title over it. The property could be
tangible such as a house or intangible such as an invention.
• Suits for specific performance: There may be a dispute as to whether
an agent has performed his contractual obligation. The plaintiff may have
private valuation over the benefit accruing from the action or the defendant
may have private information about the costs of performing the action.
• Custody battle over a child: When a couple separates, the spouses may
have private valuations over the custody of their child.
Private valuation of the subject matter in dispute is plausible when the dispute
involves something other than pure monetary compensation.
5What is required here is that the sum of the valuations of a party over divisions of the
surplus is significantly lower than the valuation over the whole surplus. The assumption of
indivisibility guarantees this in stark terms since indivisibility implies a zero valuation over
any division of the surplus.
6In an earlier draft, a model with two sided private information was presented. The as-
sumption of one sided asymmetric information is preferred for two reasons. First, it simplifies
the model considerably while delivering a clearer intuition about the result. Second, it demon-
strates more clearly how the mechanics that drive the result are not the ones subsumed in
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and related papers.
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Timeline:
Stage 1: A dispute arises between the two parties. Parties decide to either litigate
or negotiate.
Stage 2: If parties choose to negotiate, they play a game that may help them avoid
taking the matter to court.
Stage 3: Parties either accept the equilibrium allocation of the game played in stage
2, or approach the court.
Stage 4: If either agent approaches the court, the court makes a final decision.
At this point, we can preview how the result of litigation in equilibrium is
established. As a consequence of the ex-post participation constraints arising
from stage 3, the surplus will have to be allocated efficiently to agent 1 who
always has higher valuation. This implies that for incentive compatibility, the
transfer to agent 2 must be independent. However due to budget balance, going
back to stage 2 it will be impossible to satisfy interim participation constraint
for agent 1. This implies that in stage 1, anticipating the failure of negotiations,
agents will choose to litigate.
To solve the model backwards, l will start with the payoff from litigation in
stage 4 in section 2.1. For litigation to be avoided this payoff from litigation
must be weakly lower than the allocations prescribed by the mechanism in stage
3 for at least some belief that agent 1 holds following the revelations compatible
with those allocations. This is discussed in section 2.2. Finally, going back to
the start of stage 2, for agents to participate in negotiations, the allocations from
stage 3 must be greater than the interim participation constraints arising from
litigation at that point. This is discussed in section 2.3. The result of litigation
in equilibrium arises when there are conditions under which agent 1 anticipates
that the payoff from litigation will dominate any possible equilibrium allocation
from the mechanism. Proposition 1 establishes this result.
Before we solve the model, note that the only piece of asymmetric informa-
tion in this model is the type of agent 2. The posterior probability that agent
1 associates with agent 2 being a high type can be represented as
q =
qH(1− γ)
qH(1− γ) + qLγ , γ ∈ [0, 1] (1)
where γ is the probability of agent 2 making the particular declaration he has
made conditional on being high type. If agent 2 makes a declaration that would
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only be made by a high type then γ = 0 and he is revealed to be a high type
with certainty. Similarly if he makes a declaration that can only be made by
a low type then γ = 1. If no information is revealed by agent 2’s declaration
then γ = 12 and the posterior of agent 1 is equal to her prior. Hence all possible
posterior beliefs of agent 1 can be captured by varying γ ∈ [0, 1]. Agent 1’s
prior qH , and the information revealed by the end of stage 3 captured by γ are
common knowledge. Consequently q, the posterior belief of agent 1 at the end
of stage 3, is also common knowledge. With some abuse of notation I treat
q ∈ [0, 1] as the space of all possible beliefs of agent 1 in which the prior qH is
one element. The prior beliefs of agent 1 are represented by q = qH . Following
Celik and Peters (2011), I treat q as a sufficient statistic for any information
that is revealed during negotiations.
2.1 Litigation
Litigation can be thought of as a game of incomplete information that agents
play in court. Agent 1 chooses her actions based on her belief about agent 2’s
type while agent 2 chooses his action based on his true type and on agent 1’s
belief about his type. In principle, this game can be static or staggered over
multiple periods. At this stage we can remain entirely agnostic about these
issues and focus directly on the equilibrium payoffs of the two players. Another
thorny issue that could arise is one of multiple equilibria in the litigation game.
This paper has nothing to say about how agents compute their expected payoffs
in the face of multiple equilibria. The goal here is to take the expected payoffs as
exogenous and place conditions on them such that we can derive our result about
the unavoidability of litigation. In section 3 we will see how the assumptions
required for the result arise endogenously when the litigation game is assumed
to take the form of a generalised Tullock contest. Let x1(q) and xj(q) be the
equilibrium actions of the two agents. The expected payoffs can be represented
as
v1(x1(q), θ1, q) and vj(x1(q), xj(q), q, θ1, θj) (2)
Going forward, to simplify notation, I will supress the equilibrium actions and
types and denote the value functions as v1(q) and vj(q). This paper has nothing
to say about how this expectations are formed. The value functions of the two
agents depend on agent 1’s belief about agent 2’s type where q is the probability
she associates with agent 2 being a high type.
To capture the fact that litigation is inefficient we may focus on the case
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where
θ1 > v1(q) + Ej(vj(q)) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
This implies that since agent 1’s valuation is always higher than that of agent
2, in expected terms it is always better to settle out of court by allocating the
surplus to agent 1 in exchange for some transfer to agent 2. In the absence
of equation (3), it would be efficient for parties to pursue litigation since the
expected surplus would be higher with litigation. However what we will find is
that the results of the paper arise even when equation (3) holds.
One of the properties of these payoffs is that it is possible that agent 2 is
allocated the surplus with a positive probability in the litigation game. This
leads to the following question: why do courts allocate the surplus to agent 2
at all when agent 1 is known to have a higher valuation of the surplus? This
question is not answered in the paper. In reality courts typically base their
decisions on other factors such as the claims of the parties regarding property
rights over the surplus. The question of why courts base their decisions on other
factors, when it is clearly ex-post efficient to base these entirely on valuations,
is an interesting question of optimal institutional design that is not addressed
here. Taking the assumption of an inefficient court system as exogenous, what
is derived here is the inability of agents to settle their disputes out of court
regardless of how well they negotiate.
2.2 Ex-Post Participation
The allocations arising from negotiation need to satisfy ex-post participation
constraints. This implies that the allocations should guarantee a payoff that is
weakly greater than the expected payoff from litigation for both parties. Al-
though, ex-ante an allocation contains a probability of the surplus being allo-
cated to either of the two agents, ex-post since the surplus is indivisible, it must
go to one of them. The agents make their decision about whether to litigate
after this realisation. To analyse the ex-post participation we must look sepa-
rately at the constraints that arise when the surplus goes to agent 1 and when
it goes to agent 2. Let µ1(q) be agent 1’s payoff when the surplus is allocated
to her and µj(q) be the payoff of type j agent 2 when the surplus is allocated
to him. The ex-post participation constraints are
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θ1 − vj(q) ≥ µ1(q) ≥ v1(q),
θj − v1(q) ≥ µj(q) ≥ vj(q), j ∈ {H,L}.
(4)
The first constraint arises when the surplus goes to agent 1. In this case
the payoff to agent 1 is her valuation θ1 net of the transfer she makes to agent
2. The transfer to agent 2 must be at least vj(q), his ex-post participation
constraint. Hence θ1−vj(q) ≥ µ1(q). Moreover µ1(q) must also be greater than
v1(q) to ensure that the ex-post participation constraint of agent 1 is satisfied.
The second equation is the corresponding constraint for when the surplus is
allocated to agent 2.
Note that q is the posterior belief of agent 1 about agent 2 being a high
type. As long as there exists a q such that these constraints, along with the
incentive constraints that are to follow in section 2.3, are satisfied there would be
a possibility of avoiding litigation as long as the allocation from the mechanism
leaves agent 1 with the ‘optimal’ belief such that the payoff from litigation
thereafter is lower than the allocation offered to her. The results will establish
the conditions under which this will not be possible.
2.3 Incentive Compatibility
Before resorting to costly litigation, parties can play any Bayesian game in the
form of negotiation. This problem of a general game form is tractable using the
revelation principle since any equilibrium in a Bayesian game can be replicated
by the use of a direct mechanism where the parties reveal their types truthfully
to a mediator. To see whether litigation can be avoided, we need to check
whether an allocation that weakly dominates the payoffs from litigation for the
two agents, and one that does not require external financing is implementable.7
Consider a direct mechanism where agent 2 declares a type j where j ∈
{H,L}. If the declaration of agent 2 is θj , then agent 2 is allocated the surplus
with probability δj and agent 1 is allocated the surplus with probability 1 −
δj . The expected transfers for agent 1 and a type j agent 2 are t1 and tj
7It is reasonable to impose the restriction of no external financing since parties in the real
world cannot expect outside subsidies for the settlement of private disputes. If budget balance
is not imposed then in this set up the problem would disappear since a Groves mechanism
would always ensure incentive-compatibility. See Groves (1973) and the generalisation in
Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979).
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respectively.8 Following are standard the incentive-compatibility constraints
for agent 2 for the direct mechanism
δHθH + tH ≥ δLθH + tL
δLθL + tL ≥ δHθL + tH ,
which can be rewritten as
(δH − δL)θH ≥ tL − tH ≥ (δH − δL)θL. (5)
The exercise here is to find an allocation composed of transfer tj along with
probability δj that satisfy incentive-compatibility, budget balance, and ex-post
participation for both types. If such an allocation exists then agent 2 would
reveal his type truthfully knowing that the allocation guarantees that agent 1
cannot credibly threaten litigation ex-post. Since δj may be positive, and the
surplus is indivisible, there could be states when the surplus is allocated to agent
2 even though agent 1 always has a greater valuation of the surplus. I will rule
this out using the following assumption
Assumption 2.
v1(q) + vH(q) > θH , ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 1. If assumption (2) is satisfied and budget balance is imposed, the
surplus must always be allocated to agent 1, and the transfer to agent 2 must be
constant in his declaration.
Proof. First note that the incentive compatibility constraints from equation (5)
implies that δH ≥ δL. Hence δH = 0 implies δL = 0. Consider a state where
the surplus is allocated to a high type agent 2. In this case the second ex-post
participation constraint from equation (4) applies. This implies that agent 1
must get a transfer of at least v1(q) and µH(q) can be at most θH − v1(q). If
however assumption (2) holds then no µH(q) is feasible under budget balance
such that µH(q) ≥ vH(q). Hence δH = δL = 0, and the surplus must always be
allocated to agent 1. Substituting into the incentive constraints in equation (5)
8Note that a direct mechanism captures equilibria of any game played at the negotiation
stage as a consequence of the revelation principle. See Bester and Strausz (2001) for an
extension of the revelation principle to environments without commitment where there is a
single agent with private information.
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this implies
tH = tL. (6)
This lemma shows that when assumption (2) holds, it will not be possible
for agents to play a game at the negotiation stage that yields an equilibrium
allocation with a positive probability of the surplus being transferred to agent
2. This is because in the event the surplus is allocated to agent 2, agents would
find that even the maximum possible transfer to agent 1 that agent 2 is willing
to make does not satisfy her ex-post participation constraint. Therefore, ex-
ante, if agents are to avoid litigation we must restrict attention to allocations
where the surplus goes to agent 1 with certainty and the transfer to agent 2
is constant. Since agent 2 knows that the surplus will always go to agent 1,
he has an incentive to make the declaration that guarantees him the maximum
possible transfer. The only way to incentivise him to tell the truth is to make
the transfer independent of his declaration.
2.4 Result
In this section we will establish the result of unavoidability of litigation. The
result will show how no implementable allocation exists that yields a payoff to
the agents that is at least as high as v1(qH) and vj(qH), the expected payoffs
from litigation.
I will assume that the value functions of both agents are continuous in q,
the posterior probability that agent 1 associates with agent 2 being a high type.
The assumption of continuity guarantees that the complete information value
functions arise as the limits of the incomplete information value functions as the
uncertainty about agent 2’s type disappears. Let vji be the complete information
value function for agent i when agent 2 has type j. Finally we need
Assumption 3.
lim
q→0
(
v1(q) + vH(q)
)
> θ1.
Since value functions are continuous in q equation assumption (3) implies
that there exists a q∗ such that
v1(q) + vH(q) ≥ θ1 ∀q ∈ [0, q∗]. (7)
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This condition guarantees overestimation. In an environment of complete infor-
mation, the litigation payoffs of the two opposing agents must always add up to
less than θ1 due to the inefficiency of litigation. When types are unobservable
and q is small, agent 1 expects agent 2 to be a low type. However in the event
agent 2 is actually a high type, equation (7) guarantees that agent 1 overesti-
mates his expected payoff from litigation and that this rational overestimation
is large enough to generate litigation. We are now ready to prove the result.
Proposition 1. If the litigation payoffs are continuous in q and satisfy assump-
tions (2) and (3) then there exists a q∗ such that for qH < q∗ no implementable
allocation exists that yields a payoff at least as high as the payoff from litigation
for the two agents.
Proof. First note that lemma 1 shows that when assumption (2) holds, for
an allocation to satisfy the ex-post participation constraints, the surplus must
be allocated to agent 1, and the transfer to agent 2 must be constant in his
declaration. Let us call this transfer t = tH = tL. This must satisfy
t ≥ max{vj(qH)} ∀j ∈ {L,H} (8)
to ensure that agent 2’s ex-post participation constraint is satisfied. Similarly
we need agent 1’s allocation to satisfy her interim participation constraint. That
is
θ1 − t ≥ v1(qH) (9)
However assumption(3) implies that there exists a q∗ such that for qH < q∗
v1(qH) + vH(qH) > θ1. (10)
Since t ≥ vH(qH), no t exists that can simultaneously satisfy constraints in
equations (8) and (9). Consequently no implementable allocation exists that
yields a payoff that is at least as high as the payoff from litigation for both
parties.
This result shows that at least one of the two agents will reject negotiations
because he or she will expect to do strictly worse than the litigation outcome.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If the sum of the expected payoffs from
litigation for agent 1 and high type agent 2 are high enough, the surplus must
always go to agent 1. In this case the transfer to agent 2 must be independent of
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his type. This is shown in lemma 1. Consequently the lowest transfer that must
be made to agent 2 to ensure that his ex-post participation is vH(q). Proposition
1 shows that when agent 1’s prior qH is low enough she prefers to litigate rather
than treat agent 2 as if he were a high type. The result indicates that litigation
will be inevitable in stage 1 for distributions when the qH is less than q∗ since
agents will correctly anticipate the breakdown in negotiations.
2.5 No Veto Rights
As we would expect, if parties can be prevented from quitting negotiations uni-
laterally, then this is sufficient to avoid litigation. This can happen if contracts
where parties waive their right to litigate are enforceable. In this section I will
show that once we take away an agent’s right to veto allocations ex-post, it is
possible to come up with an implementable allocation that the agents would
prefer over litigation.
Proposition 2. There always exists a budget balanced and incentive compat-
ible allocation that Pareto weakly dominates the equilibrium allocation under
litigation.
Proof. Let the payoffs to agent 1 and type j agent 2 from litigation be v1(qH) =
α1(qH)θ1+x1 and vj(qH) = αj(qH)θj+xj . Since these are assumed to arise from
a bayesian game they must satisfy incentive compatibility. Moreover since the
litigation game is unsubsidised by a third player it also satisfies budget balance.
Hence we can simply set δ1 = α1(qH), t1 = x1 and δj = αj(qH), tj = xj . These
allocations satisfy the interim participation constraints for agent 1 and both
types of agent 2 trivially.
The proof of proposition 2 is constructive. It shows the allocation that
satisfies incentive compatibility, budget balance, and the interim participation
constraints is the allocation from conflict itself. When ex-post constraints no
longer need to be satisfied it is possible to set δH > 0. This implies that tH = tL
is no longer necessary for incentive compatibility ensuring that it is possible to
guarantee agent 1 vH(qH) for all possible qH .
Proposition 2 shows that under full contractability, at the very least it is
always possible to replicate the litigation payoffs through negotiations. Hence
litigation would never occur since it would be (at least weakly) individually ratio-
nal for agents to contract away their quitting rights at the start of negotiations.
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Consequently it would not be possible for an agent to credibly threaten their op-
ponent with litigation ex-post to force the renegotiation of the allocation. Hence
the allocation from negotiations need not satisfy the additional constraints of
ex-post participation. This proposition is obvious when seen in the light of the
well understood theoretical insight that the possibility of renegotiation ex-post
makes it more difficult to supply incentives ex-ante. Commitment alleviates the
tension between ex-ante and ex-post incentives.
3 Endogenous Value Functions
So far I have assumed that value functions are exogenous and constrained them
with sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of litigation in equilib-
rium. The strength of this approach is that it allows us to be agnostic about
the actual game form of litigation. The actual game may be simultaneous or
sequential, one shot or staggered over multiple periods. The parties may bear
their own costs as is the case under the US fee shifting rules or the court may
allocate the costs to the loser as with the English rule. The game may have a
unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria. As long as the value functions arising
from that game satisfy assumptions (2) and (3), agents would prefer to litigate.
In this section I endogenise the value functions by using a game form that has
received considerable attention in this literature namely the Tullock contest.9
There are two reasons to do this. First, this will show that the result from
proposition 1 obtains even with a standard game such as a contest. It is well
understood that contests are inefficient since the effort exerted by parties is
simply burnt away. Since agents know this they should prefer to settle out of
court. However we will find that the result in proposition 1 holds even in the face
of this inefficiency. Second, we find that the contest function approach delivers
some of the assumptions required for proposition 1 endogenously. In particular
we will find that assumption (3) and the assumption about the continuity of the
value function in q are both delivered endogenously when the litigation game is
modeled as a Tullock contest.
3.1 Litigation
The court process is modelled as a static contest where parties choose their
effort levels simultaneously, and the probability of winning is determined by the
9Tullock (1980). See Skaperdas (2006) for a survey of this literature.
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effort xˆ exerted by parties. Following are the objective functions of the two
agents.
θ1Ej
(
P(xˆ1, xˆj)
)
− xˆ1 and θj(1− P(xˆ1, xˆj))− xˆj j ∈ {L,H}
where
P(xˆ1, xˆj) =
αxˆ1
λ
αxˆ1
λ + (1− α)xˆjλ
λ, α ∈ (0, 1). (11)
This contest function has certain desirable properties.10 The parameters α and
λ are common knowledge. λ captures how sensitive the probability is to the
effort exerted by parties. A higher λ implies a greater sensitivity of the judicial
process to the persuasiveness of lawyers. A judicial process that is less sensitive
to the skill of lawyers implies a lower λ. Alternatively a high responsiveness
of the probability of winning to effort could simply mean that it is cheap and
easy to bribe judges. In this interpretation λ can be thought of as a parameter
capturing how corrupt the judiciary is.
The parameter α captures how strong agent 1’s case is ex-ante relative to
agent 2. This parameter is introduced to capture the fact that legal disputes
may be skewed towards one side.11 It is rarely the case that both sides to a
dispute have equally strong legal positions. An α equal to 1 implies that agent
1 is certain to win the case; that the case is ‘open and shut’. Note that in
the two corner cases of α ∈ {0, 1}, the efforts of parties will not play a role as
the probability of winning would be insensitive to effort since there is complete
certainty about how the court will rule. In this case litigation will be always be
avoided. For intermediate values of α, the efforts of parties would influence the
probability of winning.
Recall that q is the posterior belief of agent 1 at stage 3. Using this belief
and the contest function specified in equation (11) it is possible to solve out for
10Skaperdas (1996) provides the axiomatic foundations of this contest function for the case
of α = 1
2
. Clark and Riis (1998) generalise this to the case where α takes any value between
zero and one. This contest function is unique in that the winning probability depends on
the ratio of equilibrium efforts. It differs from the exponential contest function where the
winning probability depends on the difference of the efforts exerted by parties. This function
is easily parameterised, and allows a closed form characterisation of the value functions for
both agents. λ < 1 implies concavity and ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium.
11For a discussion on the interpretation of α in a legal context, see Hirshleifer and Osborne
(2001) and Skaperdas and Vaidya (2009).
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the Bayesian Nash equilibrium effort levels x1 and xj . These are
x1 = argmax
xˆ1≥0
(
θ1
(
q
αxˆ1
λ
αxˆ1
λ + (1− α)xλH
+ (1− q) αxˆ1
λ
αxˆ1
λ + (1− α)xλL
)
− xˆ1
)
,
(12)
and
xj = argmax
xˆj≥0
(
θj
(1− α)xˆjλ
αxλ1 + (1− α)xˆjλ
− xˆj
)
. (13)
To simplify things further, in the rest of the paper I make the following assump-
tion
Assumption 4.
θL = 0. (14)
This implies that xL(q) = vL(q) = 0 for all q. To avoid the issue of non
existence of equilibrium in the limit when q → 0, since this implies x1 = xL = 0,
I assume that in this corner case agent 1 wins the contest with certainty. This
assumption simplifies the analysis but is otherwise innocuous since it is possible
to show that θ1 is the limit of v1(q) as q goes to zero when θL = 0. The only way
to ensure this is by setting the probability of agent 1 acquiring the surplus to
1 in this corner case. An alternative way to establish the results in this section
is to assume that θL > 0. This leads to positive effort levels for two players for
both realisations of agent 2 type. All results go through mutatis mutandis when
the θL is small relative to θH and θ1. Solving for x1 and xH and plugging them
back into the objective functions for the two agents we find
v1(q) = θ1q
α(qθ1)λ
α(qθ1)λ + (1− α)θλH
(
1− λ (1− α)θ
λ
H
α(qθ1)λ + (1− α)θλH
)
+θ1(1−q) (15)
and
vH(q) = θH
(1− α)θλH
α(qθ1)λ + (1− α)θλH
(
1− λ α(qθ1)
λ
α(qθ1)λ + (1− α)θλH
)
. (16)
Note that these value functions are continuous in q which was one of the condi-
tions required for the result in proposition 1.
18
3.2 Ex-Post Participation and Incentive Compatibility
In the general setting lemma 1 shows that assumption (2) requires the surplus to
be allocated to agent 1 if the ex-post constraints are to be satisfied. We need the
parametric conditions that guarantee the analogue of assumption (2) when the
value functions arise from a Tullock contest. Lemma 2 will show that equation
(17) is that analogue. When this equation holds incentive compatibility will
imply that the transfer to agent 2 must be independent of his type.
θ1 − θH
θ1 + θH
> λ
(1− α)θλH
αθλ1 + (1− α)θλH
(17)
Lemma 2. If equation (17) is satisfied then the surplus must always be allocated
to agent 1, and the transfer to agent 2 must be constant in his declaration.
Proof. We can check from equations (15) and (16) that
∂vH(q)
∂q
< 0 and
∂v1(q)
∂q
< 0. (18)
Hence v1(1) + vH(1) > θH implies v1(q) + vH(q) > θH ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Let
αθλ1
αθλ1+(1−α)θλH
= αˆ. Substituting q = 1 and rearranging we find
v1(1) + vH(1) > θH
θ1αˆ(1− λ(1− αˆ)) + θH(1− αˆ)(1− λαˆ) > θH
(θ1 − θH)αˆ− (θ1 + θH)λαˆ(1− αˆ) > 0
θ1 − θH
θ1 + θH
> λ(1− αˆ).
(19)
The last term is equivalent to equation (17). This implies that under equation
(17) the second part of the ex-post constraints from equation (4) can never
be satisfied and hence the surplus must be allocated to agent 1, that is δH =
δL = 0. Substituting into the incentive constraints in equation (5) this implies
tH = tL.
3.3 Result
We are now ready to prove the analogue of proposition 1 for the special case
when the litigation game is modeled as a Tullock contest.
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Proposition 3. Assuming equation (17) holds, there exists a q∗ such that for
qH < q
∗ no implementable allocation exists that yields a payoff at least as high
as the payoff from litigation for the two agents.
Proof. First note that lemma 2 shows that when when assumption (17) holds,
for an allocation to satisfy the ex-post participation constraints, the surplus
must be allocated to agent 1, and the transfer to agent 2 must be constant in
his declaration. Let us call this transfer t = tH = tL. Since vL = 0, this must
satisfy
t ≥ vH(qH) (20)
to ensure that agent 2’s ex-post participation constraint is satisfied. Similarly
we need agent 1’s allocation to satisfy her interim participation constraint. That
is
θ1 − t ≥ v1(qH) (21)
However
v1(1) = θ1 (22)
and
vH(1) = θH
(1− α)θλH
α(θ1)λ + (1− α)θλH
(
1− λ α(θ1)
λ
α(θ1)λ + (1− α)(θH)λ
)
> 0. (23)
Since the value functions are continuous in q there exists a q∗ such that for
qH < q
∗
v1(qH) + vH(qH) > θ1. (24)
Since t ≥ vH(qH), no t exists that can simultaneously satisfy constraints in
equations (20) and (21). Consequently no implementable allocation exists that
yields a payoff that is at least as high as the payoff from litigation for both
parties.
To generate the result in proposition 1 we assumea that the value functions
were continuous in q. We can see from equations (15) and (16) that the value
functions arising here deliver this assumption endogenously. Furthermore the
value functions here also deliver assumption (3) endogenously.
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4 Discussion
In section 4.1, I discuss the possibility of partial commitment to the negotiation
allocations. In section 4.2, I discuss some testable implications and applications
of the theory presented in the paper.
4.1 Litigation Under Partial Waiver
Consider the following ‘no litigation’ clause that parties contract on at the start
of pre trial negotiations, “We agree to accept the allocations that the mechanism
specifies. If one of us challenges the allocation ex-post in court, then that party
must pay a large fine.” Proposition 2 shows that in this setting, if such a clause
is upheld by courts with probability one, then litigation will not arise.
This raises the question of whether litigation would arise if a limited ability
to contract away their right to litigate was available to agents; in other words
if courts upheld a ‘no litigation’ clause with a probability between zero and
one. The degree of commitment available to parties can be thought of as a
point in a continuum that is bounded by full contractibility on one end and
complete non-contractibility on the other. A natural way to capture the partial
commitment in the contest function specified in (11) is through α. Once agents
sign a contract to stick to the allocations specified by the mechanism, it affects
α when the case reaches court ex-post. In a world with complete contractibility,
when agent 1 considers approaching the court ex-post, she would find that α
equals zero. This means that agents would know that approaching the court in
violation of the commitment to stay out of court would invite a certain ruling
in favour of the opponent. The world with imperfect commitment would be one
where the value of α would change but the change would still not be sufficient
to bring about complete certainty about the outcome of the case, that is, α
ex-post would still be between zero and one. Consequently the result presented
here would be preserved.
One practical problem that a party may face while trying to enforce the
allocations of a mechanism is the fact that these allocations may not be observ-
able to the court. If negotiations are conducted privately between parties then
this may disable courts from observing the final allocations.12 If parties believe
12One may argue that parties may choose to negotiate publicly in order to avoid this prob-
lem. However it is often seen that parties find it undesirable to negotiate publicly for a variety
of other reasons such as protection of trade secrets in the case of intellectual property, safe
guarding the privacy of children in the case of custody battles, etc.
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that a ‘no litigation’ clause cannot be enforced due to informational reasons or
will not be enforced for legal reasons, then parties find themselves in a situation
where it is best for both parties to renegotiate. The issue of whether rational
parties can contract away the possibility of ex-post renegotiation has been ex-
tensively debated in Maskin and Tirole (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999) in
the context of incomplete contracts. The issues arising from the possibility of
contracting away the right to renegotiate are similar to ones that are salient in
this setting. If the ability to contract away the right to litigate is limited then
it follows a fortiori that the ability to avoid ex-post renegotiation is also limited
since in the first case the clause rests on the action of litigation which is easily
verifiable.
The area of law that governs the right of parties to contract away their
rights, in this case the right to judicial remedy, is called waiver. Whether such
a waiver is valid is in itself a contentious issue in law. Among other things, the
court would verify whether “functional equivalence”, that is some other form
of judicial process was available to the agents. If the mechanism for resolving
disputes looks fairly close to a judicial process, then a court is more likely to
uphold the allocations.13 For example, arbitral awards in most jurisdictions
are open to appeal only on very limited grounds. The inefficiency of arbitration
however is qualitatively similar to that of a court since the technology of decision
making resembles a contest in both cases. This model does not explain why
parties choose arbitration or litigation but provides an explanation for why
agents are unable to negotiate costlessly when their outside options arise from
costly games such as arbitration and litigation. As long as the outside options of
both agents are affected by the beliefs of agent 1 about agent 2’s type, through
for example the choice of equilibrium effort levels in the litigation or arbitration
game, the inefficiency modeled here would arise.
Why don’t the courts enforce waiver clauses if they enhance efficiency? Apart
from obvious behavioural and public policy arguments there may also be con-
vincing efficiency arguments for non-enforcement of waiver clauses in contracts.
Anderlini et al. (2011) argue that by committing to void certain contracts the
court increases ex-ante efficiency. It is possible that similar considerations in-
duce judges to void contracts where agents contract away their right to litigate.
By ensuring costly settlement of disputes courts could dis-incentivise behaviour
that leads to disputes arising. This model only shows that conditional on a
13See Fairness, Flexibility, and the Waiver of Remedial Rights by Contract (1978) for a
discussion on how courts treat waiver of judicial remedy.
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dispute already having arisen it is efficient for courts to enforce waiver clauses.
4.2 Applications
In this section I discuss the application of the model to different kinds of conflict.
I argue that the model sheds some light on the forces at work that prevent agents
from effectively avoiding conflict. I also bring out some testable implications
and discuss evidence that seems to be consistent with the predictions of the
model.
4.2.1 Intellectual Property Litigation
In this model, litigation arises due to the unobservability of valuations. The
model therefore predicts that the incidence of litigation should be negatively
correlated with the degree of observability of valuations. This implies that
more litigation should be observed in sectors where disputes are about objects
over which agents are likely to have private valuation. In relation to patents
this would imply more litigation in sectors where expected profits from a patent
are unlikely to be publicly known.
A related prediction regarding the incidence of litigation is that the rate of
litigation should be positively correlated with the range of the distribution of
valuation. In section 3 we saw how litigation arises only when the difference
between each of θ1, θH , and θL is within the right magnitude. Depending on
the use of the patent, firms are likely to have different valuations of the patent.
Under the assumption that the range of valuations increases with the possible
uses a patent has, it is possible to empirically test the relationship between the
scope of a patent and the incidence of litigation.
Lerner (1994) uses a data set where an index for the scope of a patent
is constructed. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) studies the determinants of
patent suits using data from the US patent office, the federal courts and industry
sources where they have measures for the market value of the patent. Together,
these data could be used to test the theory presented here. If the theory is
correct, we would expect to find a positive correlation between the scope of a
patent and the incidence of litigation even after controlling for things such as
the market value of the patent.
Another testable implication about the incidence of litigation arises directly
from equation (17). This equation is more easily satisfied when the case is biased
in favour of one of the two parties, that is, the value of α is close to 0 or 1. This
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is because equilibrium efforts are lower when α is close to 0 or 1. This implies
that litigation is more likely when α is close to 0 or 1. The intuition for this is
that if facts and law in a given case are heavily loaded in favour of one of the
parties, then parties spend less in court because the marginal impact of effort
on the probability of winning is lower. This makes litigation less inefficient and
consequently more likely.
4.2.2 War
Fearon (1995) argues that miscalculation of the opponent’s willingness to fight
is one of the causes of war. While discussing the incentives of states to reveal
their true willingness to fight he states:
“While states have an incentive to avoid the costs of war, they also wish to
obtain a favourable resolution of the issues. This latter desire can give them an
incentive to exaggerate their true willingness or capability to fight, . . . if they
are concerned that revelation would make them militarily (and hence politically)
vulnerable. . . ”
The model presented here supplies the micro-foundations for this idea. Here
the willingness to fight is determined by the valuation parties place on the
subject matter in dispute. A low valuation agent takes into account the ex-post
incentive of the opponent to threaten litigation once she finds out that he has
low valuation. This vulnerability created by truthful revelation destroys the
incentives for truthfully declaring one’s valuation.
A historical example that seems to fit the argument formalised in this model
is the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1904-05 over Korea and Manchuria. A signif-
icant ingredient that led to the conflict was the desire for exclusive economic
control over Korea and Manchuria, given the investment both nations had made
in these regions (See White (1964)). For instance, in early 1903 the Russians
started lobbying for rights to construct a railway line between Seoul and Uiju.
The Japanese, being in the process of constructing a line between Seoul and
Fusan, were opposed to this. In Manchuria, Russia wanted exclusive control to
protect the large investments in the Chinese-Eastern railway that was to facili-
tate transit of goods from ports on the Pacific Ocean into Russia. Furthermore
the Russians were planning to build a port in Dalny for getting access to sea
for the Chinese-Eastern Railway. The Japanese who controlled the port of Ni-
uchuang were worried about the loss of trade resulting from the construction of
a rival port.
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There were several negotiations between the two countries in the time leading
to the conflict. The first communication happened in 1901 in the aftermath
of the Boxer Rebellion which presented the Russians with an opportunity to
increase their influence over Manchuria. In early 1901 the Russians entered into
an agreement with China that consolidated their power in Manchuria. Historical
accounts indicate that the Japanese were strongly opposed to this agreement
but the Russians failed to take this into account, believing that the Japanese
would never go to war against a strong western power.14
In late 1901, Ito Hirobumi, a Japanese minister, travelled to Russia. Ac-
counts of his negotiations indicate how he attempted to convey to the Russians
the Japanese desire for exclusive control over Korea. The Russians however were
only willing to make concessions to the extent of sharing control over Korea.
This position continued in the final negotiations in December of 1903 when the
Russians refused to accede to the Japanese demand for a neutral zone on the
banks of the Yalu river in Korea. Furthermore the Russians refused to discuss
the issue of Manchuria and maintained their stand that the Manchurian issue
was not on the table.
These accounts indicate that both the Russians and the Japanese valued the
control rights over Manchuria and Korea. Furthermore, the Russians believed
that the Japanese declarations before the war were cheap talk. This example
fits well with the idea that the incentives of parties to always overstate their
willingness to fight creates an informational asymmetry that can lead to conflict.
The opponent disbelieves any declaration about the willingness to fight and
consequently agents with genuinely high valuation are left with no option but
to fight.
5 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to offer a solution to the puzzle of existence of con-
flict between rational agents. Rational explanations of conflict are based on
the existence of informational asymmetry between agents. This informational
asymmetry is preserved by restricting communication between parties in some
way. The model presented here tries to establish the existence of conflict in a
setting where communication between parties is not restricted. In doing so this
14See Nish (1985) for a rich account of the negotiations between Russia and Japan preceding
the conflict.
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paper has attempted to solve two longstanding problems in the literature on
why people litigate.
The first problem tackled here is the problem of microfounding the pres-
ence of litigation through the existence of private information in a way that is
consistent with full disclosure theorems. The model proposed here allows all
certifiable information to be disclosed at the pre-trial stage. Private informa-
tion that creates informational asymmetries between parties is purely of the
non-certifiable kind, which is modelled as the valuation that parties place on
the subject matter in dispute. This influences the amount spent in court which
consequently influences the expected payoff from litigation thereby making it
unobservable.
The second problem that this paper tackles is the restriction that the liter-
ature has placed on the pre-trial interaction between parties. The literature so
far has assumed that parties can only interact in a bargaining framework where
communication is limited to offers and counteroffers. By studying negotiations
in a framework of mechanism design, this paper allows for richer communication
between parties.
The paper uses the theoretical insight that requiring the ex-post participa-
tion constraints to be satisfied, can significantly reduce the set of implementable
allocations. I find that this is especially the case when the outside options vary
with the belief of the uninformed agent about the type of her opponent. Using
these two ingredients I show a new inefficiency result emerges that resembles
the breakdown in negotiations leading up to litigation. I have argued that this
insight crosses over to other types of costly conflict where agents can quit nego-
tiations unilaterally.
In further work it may be interesting to develop a normative theory of the
judiciary that seeks to explain how a seemingly inefficient judiciary may be
globally optimal. Perhaps the possibility of inefficient litigation ex-post may
create incentives for efficient behaviour ex-ante. This ties back to the conception
of courts in neo-classical economics with a slight twist: courts deter undesirable
behaviour by ensuring that parties cannot efficiently negotiate themselves out
of disputes once they arise.
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